OPINION | Dhaka's Dangerous Stalemate

Bangladesh is not in the middle of a routine post-election squabble. Nine months after Tarique Rahman took oath as Prime Minister, the country is sliding into a three-way confrontation that threatens to undo the very promise of the July Uprising: a government that commands a parliamentary majority but lacks political authority, an opposition that lost the election but has captured the street, and a former prime minister in exile in India whose shadow now determines what Dhaka can and cannot do.

The February 12, 2026 election was supposed to close the chapter opened on August 5, 2024, when Bangladesh's former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina fled to India. Instead, it opened a new one. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won 209 of 297 contested seats, while opposition Jamaat-e-Islami won 68 and emerged as the main opposition after the Awami League was barred from contesting.

On paper, that is a landslide. In practice, Rahman inherited a state where legitimacy is still contested, the constitution is still contested, and the street still believes it has veto power over parliament. The tensions began from day one.

BNP MPs refused to take a second oath as members of a proposed Constitution Reform Council meant to implement the July Charter, arguing the council had no constitutional basis until a referendum formally incorporated it.

Jamaat and the National Citizen Party (NCP) boycotted the cabinet swearing-in in protest, with Jamaat saying it would take no oath unless BNP MPs took oath as members of the Council. The referendum, held alongside the election, reportedly saw over 60 percent vote yes, but the question of who gets to interpret that mandate has never been settled.

It is a legal dispute that has become a political weapon. For Jamaat and the NCP, the July Charter is not a technical document. It is their claim to be the true heirs of 2024. The NCP was born out of the student protests that toppled Hasina.

Jamaat, banned under Hasina and then rehabilitated under the Muhammad Yunus interim government, has rebuilt itself as the most disciplined organisational force in the country. Together they contested the election as an 11-party alliance, with the NCP seeking to convert street credibility into parliamentary representation.

Jamaat chief Shafiqur Rahman warned that if the government acted against the public interest, it would face protest and resistance. The NCP questioned the inclusion of former interim government national security adviser Khalilur Rahman in Rahman's cabinet as foreign minister, calling it proof of election engineering.

In recent weeks, both parties have returned to the language of the uprising: “Delhi na Dhaka” (Delhi or Dhaka), govern first, or face the street. The latest flashpoint is not the Charter, but Hasina herself. Hasina has announced she intends to return to Bangladesh in December and surrender before a court.

On November 9, her London-based lawyers, Matrix Chambers, wrote to the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi seeking a new passport and National Identity Card, after the interim government revoked her old documents. Dhaka rejected the request within hours.

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humayun Kabir said Bangladesh does not issue passports to “convicted terrorists” and reiterated the demand for her extradition. The chief prosecutor of the International Crimes Tribunal, Md Aminul Islam, said she would have no option but to face execution of the verdict if she returns.

A tribunal in 2025 sentenced her to death in absentia for crimes against humanity linked to the 2024 crackdown, which the UN estimates killed as many as 1,400 people. This is where the imbroglio between Delhi and Dhaka becomes almost farcical, and dangerous.

Dhaka wants Hasina handed over as a convict through the India-Bangladesh extradition treaty. It does not want her to return voluntarily as a citizen choosing to face trial. Delhi, for its part, says extradition is a legal matter to be dealt with accordingly, and that for travel, she would need a travel document.

The India-Bangladesh extradition treaty was amended in 2016, but India's Extradition Act still bars surrender for offences of a political character or where the request is not made in good faith, and India has in the past sought assurances against execution in death penalty cases.

But the politics are clearer than the law. A voluntary return would cast Hasina in the light of a martyr, creating a dramatic scene. On the other hand, an extradition request enables Dhaka to hold Delhi responsible for providing her refuge, while Delhi can counter by accusing Dhaka of withholding the necessary documents for her travel.

This dynamic allows both sides to project their steadfastness to their domestic audiences. However, the pressing issue remains unaddressed: what will happen if a 78-year-old former prime minister, facing a death sentence, arrives in Dhaka this December?

That unanswered question is now driving the street. The Awami League, banned since 2024, has announced a three-day nationwide outreach and protest programme from November 14 to 16, demanding restoration of democracy and public security.

Its workers have returned to the streets, clashing with BNP workers and police. Crude bombs, arson, and attacks on vehicles have been reported. The BNP, in turn, has told its MPs to stay on the streets. At a parliamentary party meeting on November 9, Rahman instructed lawmakers to remain politically active and confront all plots.

Jamaat and the NCP have responded not by joining the BNP's call for unity, but by asking why political parties should do the work of the police. Therefore, the current crisis in Bangladesh can be characterised by three key fronts: a banned political party attempting to regain its influence, the ruling party striving to assert its control over the streets, and an opposition party that is accusing the government of its inability to effectively govern.

To top it all lies yet another...