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OPINION | Quad Is Securitised, But It's Not 'Asian NATO'

ABP NewsBy ABP News
19 Nov 2026
Original: English
OPINION | Quad Is Securitised, But It's Not 'Asian NATO'
OPINION | Quad Is Securitised, But It's Not 'Asian NATO'
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OPINION | Quad Is Securitised, But It's Not 'Asian NATO'

Key Highlights & Official Takeaways
  • ✓OPINION | Quad Is Securitised, But It's Not 'Asian NATO'
  • ✓On 17 November 2026, in Manila, that fiction finally cracked.
  • ✓The P-8-India flies the P-8I, the US and Australia fly the P-8A-and Japan's P-3C Orion are not humanitarian platforms.
  • ✓Unlike Japan, Australia or the United States, India shares a 3,488-km disputed land border with China.
Comprehensive News & Policy Report

The Quad, consisting of India, United States, Japan and Australia, has finally put on the uniform. Manila did what Wilmington could not: it securitised the Quad. For almost two decades, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has lived a double life.

In public, it was a grouping of democracies delivering vaccines, building undersea cables, tracking illegal fishing, and talking about a “free, open, inclusive and resilient Indo-Pacific.” In private, everyone knew what it was really about: China.

On 17 November 2026, in Manila, that fiction finally cracked. For the first time in over two years, the leaders of India, the United States, Japan and Australia-Narendra Modi, Donald Trump, Sanae Takaichi and Anthony Albanese-met for a Quad leaders' summit on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit.

And for the first time, they put a military exercise in a Quad context. “In 2027, our respective P-8 and P-3C patrol aircraft are scheduled to fly in a maritime exercise for the first time in a Quad context, making our seas safer,” the joint press statement said.

That one sentence changes the Quad. It is no longer just a dialogue. It is now, however cautiously, an operational security grouping. The aircraft matter. The P-8-India flies the P-8I, the US and Australia fly the P-8A-and Japan's P-3C Orion are not humanitarian platforms.

They are built to hunt submarines, track surface fleets, and conduct surveillance and reconnaissance. To fly them together, under a Quad banner, is to practise anti-submarine warfare together. The Quad maritime exercise is expected to be explicitly linked to the new Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration (IPMSC), a mechanism to enhance information-sharing and maritime domain awareness.

No country resisted this moment more consistently than India. New Delhi's inhibition was never unknown. It was structural. Unlike Japan, Australia or the United States, India shares a 3,488-km disputed land border with China.

It has fought a war with Beijing in 1962, lost soldiers in Galwan in 2020, and since then has had to maintain a much larger troop presence along a border that External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has described as “more alive.” A maritime provocation in the South China Sea or the Indian Ocean could be answered by Beijing on land, in Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh, where India is most vulnerable.

India has long insisted that the Quad is not a security alliance and not aimed at China. Under this dialogue, India sought American technology, Japanese capital and Australian minerals, but not an American war plan. That is why, for years, India kept the real military work outside the Quad label.

The Malabar naval exercise began as an India-US exercise, later included Japan and then Australia, but the official narrative always stated that this particular exercise in the high seas is not part of the Quad. The Quad could do vaccines, supply chains, and critical minerals.

Malabar could do war fighting. Never the twain would meet. New Delhi has long feared that militarising the Quad would permanently fuse China and Pakistan into a single two-front threat. If New Delhi joined an overt anti-China bloc, Beijing would have every incentive to arm Islamabad more aggressively, share more intelligence, and coordinate pressure on both fronts.

Strategic ambiguity, in this view, was not weakness. It was insulation. Beijing understood this perfectly and exploited it. Chinese state media repeatedly urged India to preserve its strategic autonomy, arguing that New Delhi was unlikely to undermine improving ties with China by joining efforts to contain it.

For a long time, that caution worked-or at least, it seemed to. The premise of Indian restraint was that if India did not provoke Beijing, Beijing would not escalate. That premise has collapsed. China has widened its naval footprint across the Indo-Pacific, including the Indian Ocean Region, deployed survey vessels and submarines, built dual-use ports from Djibouti to Gwadar to Hambantota, and continued to press on the Himalayan border even as it talked about stabilisation.

Restraint did not buy restraint in return. Additionally, China's backing of Pakistan during Operation Sindoor in May 2025 made New Delhi realise that it gained little by self-censoring its Quad cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia.

And, the foremost factor in this was US President Donald Trump's return to the White House. Trump had already skipped the Quad Summit India had planned to host last year, amid uncertainty over his travel and tensions with New Delhi over a trade deal.

For India, the choice was stark. Agree to a modest, carefully bounded securitisation-a patrol aircraft exercise, not a mutual defence treaty, not joint patrols in the South China Sea, not a Quad navy-or risk Trump walking away from the Quad altogether and cutting a grand bargain with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, in Shenzhen two days later.

New Delhi chose the former. It was not enthusiasm. That is why the Manila statement is so revealing in its omissions. Unlike the expansive 2024 Wilmington Declaration, it does not explicitly mention the South or East China Sea, even as it “strongly oppose[s] any destabilising or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, including by force or coercion”.

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Official Notice Specification
Issuing AuthorityABP News
Topic CategoryWORLD
JurisdictionAll India / National
Publication Date19 November 2026
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Official Source Attribution: ABP News
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